India's Climate Policy: Squaring the Circle by Raghunandan, D.
The 17th Conference of Parties (COP17) at
Durban represents a watershed, for good or ill
depending on your point of view, in the
international negotiations towards a global
climate agreement. COP17 did not agree on a
second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol
for 2012 onwards, nor did it finalise terms of an
alternative agreement. Yet it did set in motion a
definitive process – the Durban Platform for
Enhanced Action – and delineated some
guidelines for a new agreement to be drawn up
by 2015 and take effect in 2020. While there are
of course many interpretations of the Durban
outcome, there is broad concurrence that the
Durban Platform is neither completely open-
ended nor fully predefined (Dubash 2012b;
Bidwai 2011; Levi 2011; Raghunandan 2011;
Rajamani 2011). The extremely brief Durban
Platform text calls for a new ‘protocol, another
legal instrument or an agreed outcome with
legal force’, the last phrase being inserted at
India’s insistence and breaking the deadlock
(UNFCCC 2011). The new arrangement would
be based on ‘options for a range of actions’,
clearly quite different from commitments as
under Kyoto, and would be ‘applicable to all
parties’ rather than follow the Kyoto principle of
common but differentiated responsibilities for
developed and developing countries. The
additional phrase that this arrangement would
be ‘under the [UN Framework] Convention’ is
open to widely varying interpretations and adds
little clarity. The Durban Platform therefore
throws open to debate virtually all issues under
negotiation, including many settled earlier under
the Kyoto Protocol, but appears to tilt the
balance in favour of developed countries by not
insisting on stiff emission reduction targets and
also as we shall see by circumscribing the
negotiating positions of developing nations.
Within these limitations, however, there may still
remain some scope for shaping the architecture
of a new and meaningful global system for
regulating greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions into
the atmosphere. 
Proceedings at Durban, read along with those at
the preceding Cancun and Copenhagen
summits, point to developed country positions
playing a dominant role in shaping the final
outcome. However, despite large developing
nations such as China and India historically not
having advanced decisive formulations, the
positions of these nations, both with high
emissions with high growth rates, will likely be of
considerable significance and could have a major
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impact on outcomes. The iconic image from the
last day at the Durban conference, of India’s
Environment Minister Jayanthi Natarajan
surrounded by envoys of the USA, EU and key
developing country players all trying to persuade
her to sign off on an agreed formulation, is
indicative of the key role these large developing
countries could play. It also dramatically
portrayed India’s isolation at Durban.1
Set against this background, this article seeks to
examine what role India can or should play in
the Durban Platform process in the months
ahead, and what factors would drive India’s
positions. Much as one may like to, space
limitations do not permit a discursive
examination of India’s positions through the
tortuous course of international climate
negotiations over almost two decades.2 Their
main elements are, however, summarised very
briefly even at the risk of oversimplification,
mainly to enable readers unfamiliar with the
subject to follow the ensuing discussions.    
1 Main elements of India’s position
From the outset, India had pioneered steps
towards formulation of, and firmly anchored its
position in, the principle embodied in the UN
Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC) that underpins the Kyoto Protocol
and all climate negotiations. This principle
maintains that developed countries, being
primarily responsible for the accumulated
atmospheric GHGs and for the continued high
per capita emissions which together cause the
climate problem, bear the main responsibility for
the requisite clean-up through reduction of GHG
emissions and for the transfer of funds and
technology to enable developing countries to
cope with climate impacts and to adopt such
mitigation measures as they can (UNFCCC
1992). India had long been a staunch advocate
and defender of the Kyoto Protocol principle of
‘common but differentiated responsibility’ or
CBDR derived from the Convention, and the
firewall erected in it between the legally binding
obligations of developed countries and the
voluntary actions developing countries may take
according to their ‘respective capabilities’ or
RC,3 subject to transfer of funds and
technologies from developed countries. India
stoutly and for a long time resisted efforts by the
USA and other developed nations to pressure
India and other large developing countries to
dismantle this firewall and accept a single
framework for mitigation obligations. 
However, in the run up to Copenhagen, in the face
of mounting pressure from developed nations and
keeping in mind announcements of mitigation
commitments by other large developing countries
such as China, Mexico, South Africa and
Indonesia, India announced unilateral measures
to reduce its emissions intensity by 20–25 per cent
by 2020 compared to current levels. This was
formally placed on record in the informal
Copenhagen Accord and its pledge-and-review
system applicable to all countries that was
subsequently formalised at Cancun. The factors
behind and implications of this position for India’s
stance is the subject of much debate within India
and will of course be discussed here.
Meanwhile, the USA refused to join the Kyoto
Protocol but participated in all COP deliberations
as a signatory to the Convention and kept
pushing its interests, which other nations
pandered to in the vain hope of getting the USA
on board. Many other developed countries
followed the US lead while the EU, which earlier
favoured deep emission cuts, began watering
down its commitments and veered toward the US
position of seeking a single framework for both
developed and developing countries, as in the
Copenhagen pledge-and-review system, which
major developing nations agreed to. How India,
or for that matter other developing countries,
factor these developed country positions into
their their own stance is not very clear and is
another issue addressed in this article.  
In the midst of all these varying and often
divergent positions, it was India that found itself
isolated at Durban from both developed and
developing countries, notably the Least Developed
Countries (LDCs) and the Small Island
Development States (SIDS), when it refused to
sign on to the idea of a new legally binding treaty
before its terms became clear. While finally
agreeing to a consensus declaration including a
term that India perceived to be a less definitive
formulation of the nature of any future
agreement, India insisted that the original idea of
equity between nations should remain the guiding
principle in any future agreement. India now
needs to work out, with careful attention to detail
and nuance, the position it would take in the
forthcoming negotiations under the Durban
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Platform, the broad goal it sets for the new global
climate agreement, and the approach it should
adopt in order to achieve this goal or as much of it
as possible.
2 Science and the global goals 
I shall begin with the global emission control
goals for mitigating climate change because, so
often while discussing the negotiations and the
realpolitik that comes into play, the overall goal
and what is sought to be achieved are forgotten,
much to the detriment of the debate. 
The Durban outcome has clearly left the world no
better off than before. Far from agreeing on
terms for the second commitment period of the
Kyoto Protocol – a goal originally set for
Copenhagen two years before that at Bali – the
Durban summit in the main postponed this to
2020. This despite the broad scientific consensus
represented in the IPCC Fourth Assessment
Report (IPCC/AR4) that atmospheric GHG
concentrations are close to a ‘tipping point’
beyond which lies possible irreversible climate
change, and that urgent mitigation actions are
required including a reduction of global
emissions of 50 per cent by 2050 and a reduction
of emissions by developed countries of up to 40
per cent compared to 1990 levels by 2020 and
90–95 per cent by 2050 (IPCC 2007a: 36–37ff).
Many authoritative agencies and groups estimate
that the voluntary pledges made at Cancun by 85
nations, following the pattern set in the
Copenhagen Accords and which are presumed to
prevail till the new dispensation comes into play,
will see global average temperatures rise by
3–3.5°C (Kartha and Erickson 2011; UNEP 2011).
This is far above the oft-repeated goal, reiterated
in Durban, of limiting global average
temperature rise to 2°C. It is worth recalling that
this egregious fiction was first enunciated at G8
Summits and regrettably joined in by leading
developing countries including India, China,
Brazil and South Africa in the so-called ‘Major
Economies Forum’ which later morphed into the
G20.4 The problem of course is that all the parties
know full well that, with the pledges currently on
the table, this goal cannot be achieved. Indeed,
the goal should never have been set in terms of
temperature in the first place, since this is an
outcome that cannot be directly controlled; it
should have been set in terms of emissions or
atmospheric GHG concentrations that can be
measured and regulated. 
The low ambition for emission reduction targets
has serious consequences, especially for India
and South Asia in general, which are projected to
be among the regions worst affected by climate
change (IPCC 2007b). Regrettably, while being
noted pro forma in official policy statements by
India, the need to reduce impacts by raising
global mitigation targets has not been factored
in as a national security imperative to be
achieved through global agreements under the
UNFCCC. This may appear to be an unkind and
inapt remark when considered against the
callousness of the USA and its allies in the global
North who, despite being responsible for over
three-quarters of the accumulated stock of
carbon in the atmosphere, have consciously and
consistently evaded their primary responsibility
to clean up the pollution they have caused. The
point here, however, is that India’s stance and
the role it plays in international negotiations
would have, and should have, been quite
different had India taken greater cognisance of
this imperative.  
It is indeed ironic that, while India is very similar
to most LDCs and SIDS in terms of energy
poverty, low per capita emissions, potential impact
of and vulnerability to climate change, it has
found itself or rather has chosen to locate itself in
the negotiations not along with these countries
which played a key role in pushing the Durban
summit towards an agreement, but among the
economically advanced nations of the global
North. India’s isolation at Durban was not so
much a diplomatic failure as one stemming from
India’s negotiating position being weakly
grounded both in global climate goals and India’s
vulnerabilities. 
3 Climate policy and foreign policy
To be fair, India finds itself in a cleft stick,
especially so in recent years due to its growing
economy. This newly acquired stature, and
India’s enthusiasm in reorienting its foreign
policy towards realising its great power
aspirations, have created expectations and
obligations on the international stage. At the
same time, despite India’s supposedly booming
economy, more than half its population continues
to be mired in poverty with many development
indicators on a par with the poorest nations.
India has not yet reconciled these contradictory
trends in its development story in respect of
India’s climate negotiating stance.   
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As I have discussed elsewhere at length
(Raghunandan 2012), India had allowed itself to
be herded into a common position with the USA
and other Northern nations, starting with the
‘G8+5’ summits and so-called MEF Statements
referring to the global goal of 2°C, mitigation
efforts by ‘all countries’ and so on. It is
important to note that India shifted from its
traditional Kyoto Protocol developing country
stance to one of taking on mitigation obligations
without obtaining the requisite deep emission
cuts or other commitments from developed
nations, chiefly due to a pronounced pro-US
foreign policy slant. This genie was not easily to
go back into the bottle, and has come to haunt
India from Copenhagen through Durban with
ominous portents for the future. 
At Copenhagen, the USA forged a common
position with the G5 ‘emerging economies’
including India and China who, like the USA,
were reluctant to accept binding emission cuts,
and pushed through the pledge-and-review model
of the Copenhagen Accord, leaving the EU out in
the cold. At Durban, the EU turned the tables by
building a powerful coalition on the Conference
floor with the Africa Group and the Island States,
the ‘conscience of the climate summits’, and
secured acceptance of its proposal for a new
legally binding regulatory instrument. The
pressure of numbers, the clamour for a positive
decision by the COP, and the powerful sentiment
favouring concrete steps to tackle the climate
crisis viewed as an existential threat by the Island
States and most LDCs, together pressured the
USA, China and some others into shelving their
reservations, leaving India famously and
petulantly alone.
India needs to seriously ponder its complete
misreading of the mood of the COP delegates
representing most nations of the world, especially
India’s natural allies among the developing
countries. India needlessly exposed itself to the
poignant even if incorrect perception5 voiced by
Grenada’s lead delegate and spokesperson for the
Island States, that India wanting more leeway for
development without committing to emissions
controls implied that ‘while they develop, we die’
(Black 2011). India’s opposition at Durban to the
EU proposal for a new legally binding
instrument, even though no commitments had
been spelt out, also baffled legal experts
(Rajamani 2011). It is also regrettable that India
has not sought alliances with EU nations with
whom, historically as well as by current
governance structures and practices, India shares
a common preference for regulation. 
The global climate negotiations have of course
always been about political economy and therefore
bring geopolitics into play. Climate policy, though,
requires a longer-term and truly strategic view
that cannot be traded-off against or made
subservient to foreign policy goals. Since India’s
position in climate negotiations has been so
heavily shaped by its perspective on international
relations, India should perhaps look to overhaul
the diplomacy linked to its climate policy.  
4 Capability and mitigation action
With a revaluation of the science, India also needs
to rethink its understanding of what it, along with
other countries, needs to do to combat the climate
crisis. Lack of understanding of the need for
serious mitigation action by India, and failure to
integrate this into its negotiating position, has
detracted from the Indian role in climate
negotiations and contributed to the disconnect
noted between India and other developing
countries. Notwithstanding similarities in human
development indicators between India and the
LDCs, the Africa Group and the Island States, it is
evident that, along with deep cuts by developed
countries, the emissions growth trajectory of India
and other large developing countries, especially
China, needs trimming,6 and these countries have
the capability to do this. This elephant has been in
the room since release of the IPCC Fourth
Assessment Report (IPCC/AR4) in 2007 which
also called upon developing countries to ‘deviate
below their projected baseline emissions’ (IPCC
2007a: 89–90).
Again as discussed in greater detail elsewhere
(Raghunandan 2012; Raghunandan et al. 2007),
even simple back-of-envelope calculations would
clarify the issue. Out of total global emissions of
around 49 Giga tonnes (Gt) [1 Giga tonne =
1 billion tonnes] of carbon dioxide equivalent in
2005, developing country emissions were already
at around 26.5Gt and were growing as a
proportion of emissions by all countries since
emission flows by most developed nations were
levelling off. If global emissions are to come
down by 50 per cent or about 24.5Gt as called for
by IPCC/AR4 by 2050, this obviously means that
emissions by developing countries must come
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down even if developed country emissions are
reduced to nil.7 Detailed modelling exercises by
scholars in India (Kanitkar et al. 2010) taking
historical emissions into account have brought
out the kinds of moderated emissions
trajectories that India may have to follow at
current economic growth rates in order to meet
the global 2°C limit. There should be similar
trajectories for other developing countries of
slower emissions growth gradually peaking and
then declining sometime in the medium term, as
well as immediate and deep emission cuts by
developed countries.  
The Indian government belatedly and after
considerable prodding took cognisance of this in
the lead-up to Copenhagen, but badly mishandled
incorporating it into its basic negotiating
position. The decision to reduce emissions
intensity by 20–25 per cent below current levels
by 2020 was announced by India long after China
had declared a 40 per cent reduction in emissions
intensity and also after absolute cuts were
announced by South Africa, Mexico and
Indonesia. Contrary to recommendations by
many experts, scholars and civil society
organisations (Campaign for Progressive Climate
Action and Policy 2009; Raghunandan et al. 2007),
India made its announcement as a unilateral
measure rather than as conditional upon deep
emissions cuts and transfer of finance and
technology by developed nations. 
Consequently, these significant mitigation
pledges announced by India, China and other
developing countries could not be used as
leverage to extract deeper emissions cut
commitments by developed countries, and did
not stand out in the public eye at Copenhagen.
In fact, they were brushed aside as old hat during
negotiations by the USA and other developed
nations who demanded further developing
country concessions at the summit! This despite
a confidential UN assessment that the voluntary
commitments by developing countries totalled
about 5.2 billion tonnes, far exceeding those by
industrialised nations amounting to only 2.1–3.4
billion tonnes.8
Despite these shortcomings, the decision by
India to slow down emission growth rates marked
a significant shift in India’s climate policy which
had hitherto been glued to a do-nothing position.
The earlier position that India was not required
to do anything since it had not caused the
problem, had substantial justification especially
as it was in conformity with the Kyoto Protocol,
even if it outlived its usefulness. But in the
changed situation of high economic growth and
related increase of emissions in India, combined
with the compelling prognosis of IPCC/AR4,
there is a strong rationale for a position that
India, now with undoubtedly greater capability
than before, is willing to be part of the solution
despite not having been part of the problem. The
conditionality suggested above could be
reintroduced under the Durban Platform process
along with, as a bargaining chip, consideration of
the legally binding option which India has little
reason to fear (Desai 2011).
Based on the science and on the ethical principle
of ‘common but differentiated responsibility and
respective capability’, adopting such a position as a
well-reasoned choice, rather than merely taking
a step or two in response to external pressure,
has several features to commend it. It enables
India to intervene in the international debate
more positively and would demonstrate India’s
seriousness about and responsiveness to the
climate crisis and its grave consequences for
India and other developing countries. Together
with more proactive diplomacy, it could be better
leveraged to pressure developed countries on
issues of concern to developing nations such as
more ambitious mitigation targets and transfers
of finance and technology. It would also bring
India more in line with the LDCs, Island States
and other developing nations.  
5 Towards a new agreement
Going forward, it also behoves India to move
beyond its traditional defensive posture and to
put forward and promote ideas for a new
structure consistent with the science, ethics and
UNFCCC principles to replace the Kyoto
Protocol. This would need rigorous homework as
well as patient, proactive and visionary diplomacy.
There is today a substantial body of work in India
and sufficient expertise both inside and outside
government to facilitate this ambitious task. 
To illustrate, a series of studies and modelling
exercises in India (Jayaraman et al. 2012;
Kanitkar et al. 2010) have thrown up interesting
results and ideas for apportioning mitigation
targets for all countries to keep global
temperature rises to within desired limits. Later
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versions of this work are based on accumulated
stocks of atmospheric carbon, which are of course
the real trigger for climate change rather than
annual flows. With a limit to the total carbon the
atmosphere can hold for the given temperature
range, the model allocates the remaining carbon
budget to each country proportional to its
population as its ‘fair share’ after accounting for
historical emissions. Each country is then
required to cut emissions, or be permitted to
increase them, till its ‘fair share’ is reached.
More than the detailed results or the model
itself, which can be found in the referenced
material, what is of interest here is that powerful
ideas for national mitigation targets can be
evolved based on uniformly applicable criteria
(interestingly in a single framework so dear to the
USA), science and ethics rather than ad hoc
numbers. Similar carbon budget models are
being developed elsewhere too. Such ideas need
not be rigid formulaic solutions, but can form a
reasoned basis for further negotiation with all
the flexibility and pragmatism required. 
6 Domestic drivers and equity
India’s dilemma, to work out a climate position
compatible with having a large section of its
population in poverty with low human
development while at the same time having
significant industrial-economic strengths and
technological capability, cannot be resolved in
the international theatre alone. As noted earlier,
India’s climate policy has derived rather heavily
from the standpoint of international relations.
Most domestic measures were initiated by the
Indian government as part of an externally
driven agenda: India’s National Action Plan on
Climate Change, its decision to reduce emissions
intensity, setting up an Expert Group for Low-
Carbon Development, all arose from a need to
satisfy external interlocutors. 
A climate policy without a sturdy domestic
foundation will also be shaky. India has
unfortunately not done nearly enough to build a
strong domestic constituency favouring climate
action.  
No doubt there is today far greater awareness
among policymakers, officials and academics,
and sections of industry are motivated by cost
savings through energy efficiency or new
business opportunities such as in carbon credits
or renewables. However, those most vulnerable
to climate impacts such as farmers, fishermen or
other coastal communities, those suffering from
energy poverty and the poor in general are
arguably the least involved in climate policy at
any level. Indeed, how much the needs and
interests of these sections are taken into account
in formulating policy or in shaping and guiding
programme implementation is a moot point.  
While the interests of the most vulnerable
groups are important in themselves, there is a
double-edged problem with respect to climate
policy. First, India’s position at international
climate meetings will increasingly suffer in
credibility if its rhetoric on equity between
nations is not matched by comparable concerns
and actions to address equity within India. The
charge that India is ‘hiding behind the poor’,9
even if not fully justified, has gained
considerable currency. But equally, if not more
important, potential climate victims in India
have little or no stake in climate policy, even
while developing countries as a whole, and Island
States and LDCs in particular, have acquired a
substantial voice at the international level. This
situation in India needs to change, and urgently. 
Some initial steps are being taken in India to
formulate a co-benefits approach to domestic
climate policy – that is, policies that yield
developmental benefits while addressing climate
change issues (Dubash 2012b). But these are yet
to be adequately conceptualised and equity is far
from being centre stage in such efforts.
Developmental benefits from climate policy are
unlikely to trickle down to vulnerable sections
and require to be specifically planned for. 
Energy access by the poor, increased availability
of public transport especially by rail in preference
to road, rural employment and energy-saving
enterprises particularly in the non-farm sector,
retarding urbanisation rates, and other such
measures will require substantial redirection of
mainly public but also private investment. Along
with climate-proofing and adaptation
programmes, these would build a powerful
support base for climate action by India and boost
India’s negotiating strength in international fora.
The circle of India’s climate policy dilemma
cannot be squared unless domestic equity is
addressed specifically and directly. 
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Notes
1 See Dubash (2012b); Bidwai (2011);
Raghunandan (2011); Rajamani (2011), for
discussion of India’s position and role in the
Durban summit.
2 For an exhaustive description and analysis of
India’s position from different perspectives,
readers may see the collection of articles in
Dubash (2012a, chapters 7–12); especially
Dubash (2012c) in the same volume for an
analytical account of the various contending
positions within India on India’s negotiating
stance. Also Sengupta (2012) in the same
volume.
3 These terms are together referred to in the
parlance as CBDR&RC but just CBDR is more
commonly used, to the considerable detriment
of understanding of and contributions to the
debate, arising from neglect of the important
role played by capacities of countries to
respond to climate challenges with respect to
both mitigation and adaptation.   
4 See D. Raghunandan, Hokkaido G8 Summit and
Climate Change, 2008, www.delhiscienceforum.net/
environment/275-hokkaido-g8-summit-a-
climate-change-8-05-mem16-o-html (accessed
17 April 2012) and other companion articles
on the same website for a more detailed
discussion of these developments in the
G8/MEF. 
5 The perception that rising emissions of some
large developing countries such as India are
the dominant or even major factor causing
climate change is erroneous in that
temperature rises and other climate effects
are caused by the accumulated concentrations
of GHGs in the atmosphere rather than by
current flows. India’s cumulative emissions or
contribution to stocks is substantially lower
than that of most developed countries and
even its current per capita flows are roughly a
quarter of the average for developed countries.
The notion that somehow it is developing
countries that are now mainly responsible for
climate change has been assiduously, and
apparently successfully, disseminated by many
developed countries especially the USA.
However, the idea that rising emissions from
large developing countries will increasingly
represent a major problem for climate
management is correct and has been discussed
extensively in this article.  
6 Quantum of emission reductions by large
developing countries, when such emissions
should peak and so on are not discussed here
for want of space. Suffice it to note that
absolute cuts by developing countries are not
envisaged in the short term, and that
developed and developing countries need to
have different peaking years. For further
discussion on this, see Kanitkar et al. (2010),
Jayaraman et al. (2012). 
7 Due to space constraints, I have not discussed
here the important issues of when developing
country emissions should peak and then start
to decline, or the crucial role that accumulated
stocks of carbon in the atmosphere rather than
its annual emission flows (the former including
historical emissions), play in determining
climate change and the global average
temperature.
8 These estimates are made in a confidential
UN report leaked during the Copenhagen
Summit and reproduced in The Guardian on
17 December 2009, www.guardian.co.uk/
environment/2009/dec/17/copenhagen-
emissions-cuts-future-temperatures (accessed
1 March 2012).
9 This was the evocative title of a report
published by Greenpeace India in November
2007: the reference here is not intended to cite
this report or to draw any inferences from it.
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